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Explaining Asia's Low Inflation
One feature of the Asia-Pacific Basin that distin-
guishes it from most developing regions ofthe
world is its relatively low inflation. In the 1980s,
inflation in the region averaged 7 perc~nt, close
to the average for industrialized countries, but
well below the average of nearly 30 percent for
developing countries as a group, or the average
of 55 percent for Latin America. Asia's success in
curbing inflation is ofparticular interest, because
of the light it might shed on alternative explana-
tions for low inflation, including central bank
independence and domestic conditions that af-
fect the incentives for price stability.
This Weekly Letter examines the relationship be-
tween central bank independence and inflation
for seven emerging economies in Asia and finds
that the relationship is quite weak. Instead, it is
argued that low inflation largely reflects domestic
conditions conducive to price stability.
Legal central bank independence and inflation
A central bank is "independent" if it can make
monetary policy decisions that are free from po-
litical pressure and that can be overruled only
with great difficulty (for example, through legis-
lation). Such independence may be achieved
either by giving the central bank an unambig-
uous mandate for low inflation, or by giving the
central bank autonomy along various dimen-
sions, such as budgeting, policymaking, and the
tenure of the central bank chief executive officer
(CEO). The argument that central bank independ-
ence may contribute to lower inflation rests on
the premisethat monetary policies to guarantee
lower inflation may be politically unpopular. Pol-
iticians seeking reelection may prefer monetary
policies that stimulate the economy in the short
run regardless ofthe impact on inflation. A cen-
tral bank that is not independent may be un-
able to resist pressures for inflationary stimulus,
whereas a central bank that is independent might
be able to do so.
The evidence that central bank independence
can lead to lower inflation is mixed. On the one
hand, Germany's central bank has the greatest
degree of legal independence and has experi-
enced consistently low inflation. It can be argued
that the U.s. disinflation ofthe early 1980s might
have been much more difficult ifthe Fed had not
had the independence to pursue such a disinfla-
tionary policy, although this argument does little
to explain the high inflation ofthe 1970s. More-
over, Japan's central bank has little formal inde-
pendence and one of the lowest rates of inflation
among industrialized countries.
To analvze the relationship between central
bank in'dependence and fnflation more sys-
tematically, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti
(CWN, 1992) construct an index of central bank
legal independence. The index labels a central
bank as more independent if: (i) its CEO has a
relatively long term ofoffice and isnot easy to
remove; (ii)it has authority to set monetary pol-
icy even if its views conflict with the executive
branch; (iii) price stability is its major or only
objective; (iv) its lending to the public sector is
restricted. CWN's results indicate that legal in-
dependence is associated with low inflation for
industrialized countries, but not for developing
countries.
The implications of CWN's results for developing
(or rapidly growing) Asian economies are un-
clear. (We will refer to these economies as
emerging Asian economies.) On the one hand,
the results for all developing countries suggest
that no relationship between legal independence
and inflation will be found in the emerging Asian
economies. On the other hand, average inflation
in emerging Asian economies is much lower
than in developing countries as a group, and
close to that of industrialized countries. As in the
industrial countries, legal independence may be
associated with low inflation in Asia as well.
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international competitiveness by avoiding exces-
sive inflation. As noted by Edwards (1989, Chapter
6) in many developing economies, high inflation
has been associated with real exchange rate ap-
preciation and a corresponding loss of competi-
tiveness. Romer (1993) also argues that open
economies have less incentive to stimulate the
economy, partly because any given increase in
output will be associated with more inflation
in open economies than inclosed economies.
To assess the plausibility of the argument that
openness will be associated with less inflation,
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the
size of the trade sector in 1985 and average in-
flation in 1980-1989 in Asian economies. It is
apparent not only that emerging Asian econo-
mies are highly open-the ratio of exports plus
imports to GNP ranges from a low of about 30
percent for the Philippines and Indonesia to a
high of 260 percent for Singapore-but also that
in these economies openness is associated with
low inflation-the Philippines and Indonesia
have the highest rates of inflation and Singapore
the lowest. (In fact, Asian economies are on aver-
age more open and have far less inflation than
Latin American economies.) Figure 2 thus sup-
ports the view that the greater openness of these
economies gives them a greater incentive to curb
inflation. Using more formal statistical analysis,
Romer (1993) shows that openness (as measured
by the ratio of imports to output) appears to lead
to lower inflation in a large sample of countries
for the period since 1973.
To assess the relationship between central bank
independence and inflation in emerging Asian
economies, Figure 1 presents CWN's legal inde-
pendence index values and average inflation for
1980-1989 for several emerging Asian econo-
mies: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand; Hong
Kong is excluded because it had no central bank
in the 1980s, and China is excluded because it
had significant price controls over the period. An
index value often signifies full independence.
For comparison, the corresponding values for the
U.S., Germany, Japan, and the average for all de-
veloping economies also are presented.
These results suggest that central bank independ-
ence does not explain low inflation in emerging
Asian economies. This may be partly because the
legal independence index is an imperfect meas-
ure of actual independence, and also because
legal independence may not be necessary to
guarantee low inflation ifthere are incentives
to maintain price stability, or ifthere is less pres-
sure on central banks to inflate.
Second, among the emerging Asian economies,
a higher central bank independence index value
is not associated with lower inflation. For exam-
ple, the Philippines has the largest legal inde-
pendence index in the region and the highest
rate of inflation. Taiwan's independence index is
among the lowest in the region, but so is its infla-
tion rate.
Twobroad conclusionsemerge. First, centralbanks
in emerging Asian economies are not usually in-
dependent. In particular, the independence index
value among emerging Asian economies is about
3 on average, slightly lower than the 3.3 average
for all developing countries, and well below Ger-
many's 6.9 or the U.s:s 4.8. However, average
inflation in emerging Asian economies was much
lower than the 29 percent rate for all developing
countries. The contrast is even more striking
comparing the emerging Asian economies to
Latin America (not shown), where the index av-
eraged 3.6 and inflation averaged 55 percent.
Incentives for price stability
The policies of Asian central banks might have
led to low inflation ifthere were a strong incen-
tive at all levels of government to maintain price
stability as a result ofthe openness oftheir econ-
omies. In particular, it can be argued that emerg-
ing Asian economies have depended very heavily
on international trade as the basis for their eco-
nomic success, and they have maintained theiro -+---r----r---r--r---~-...,
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budget formulation is primarily the responsibility
of civil servants rather than politicians, and par-
liamentary rules restrict the legislature's ability
to alter the budget. The more successful Asian
economies also have been able to avoid central
bank subsidies to banks or large state enter-
prises. This type of financing often is not re-
flected in the budget estimates, but itcan be
highly inflationary.
in Asia, the inflationary impact of budget deficits
has been limited even in those cases where the
deficits are large. For example, Malaysia's very
rapid growth and high rates of private saving al-
lowed it to sustain large deficits (averaging 11 per-
cent of GNP) without triggering inflation. Rapid
growth and private saving increased the demand
for money and domestic financial assets, thus
raising the proportion ofthe deficit that could be
financed by printing money without inflation, as
well as the overall level of government borrowing
that was willingly financed by domestic and for-
eign residents. (See World Bank 1993 for more
details on the points raised in this section.)
less pressure to inflate
Apart from having an economic incentive to
maintain price stability, the pressures to inflate
on central banks in emerging Asian economies
also have been smaller than in other regions.
One reason is that these economies have grown
very fast as a result of increases in their produc-
tive capacity; this minimizes the pressure to
boost economic growth through inflation.
Another reason is that budget deficits in emerg-
ing Asian economies are by and large sustain-
able, or easily financed, so that the pressure on
Asian central banks to inflate in order to finance
deficits is small. In some cases, the size of bud-
get deficits is limited by law. For example, in
Thailand, deficits are limited to a small percent-
age ofthe year's total expenditure, and there is a
cap on the percentage ofthe budget that can be
spent servicing the foreign public debt. Budget
authorities also consult the central bank to assess
the inflationary impact of budget deficits. In In-
donesia, expenditures have been limited to the
amount financed by domestic revenues and for-
eign aid since 1967.
Budget deficits also have been curbed by insulat-
ing the budget process from political pressure.
For example, in Thailand and Indonesia, detailed
Conclusions
The example ofAsian economies highiights some
ofthe conditions under which countries may
achieve low inflation in the absence of central
bank independence. These countries achieved
low inflation in part because the need to keep
the large trade sector competitive created strong
incentives for maintaining price stability. In addi-
tion, rapid growth and sustainable budget deficits
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